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• The aim of the present paper is to shed light on the interaction between capacity
straints and local monopoly power using a standard Hotelling setup.
• Substantial horizontal product differentiation results in a variety of equilibrium
behavior and it generates at least one pure-strategy equilibrium for any capacity le
• The existence of pure-strategy equilibria for every capacity pair is in stark contrast
most of the literature on capacity-constrained pricing.
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Abstract
Since Kreps and Scheinkman's seminal article (1983) a large number of pa-
pers have analyzed capacity constraints' potential to relax price competition.
However, the majority of the ensuing literature has assumed that products are
either perfect or very close substitutes. Therefore very little is known about the
interaction between capacity constraints and local monopoly power. The aim
of the present paper is to shed light on this question using a standard Hotelling
setup. The high level of product differentiation results in a variety of equilib-
rium firm behavior and it generates at least one pure-strategy equilibrium for
any capacity level.
EL Classification: D21, D43, L13
eywords: Duopoly, Bertrand-Edgeworth competition, Hotelling, Capacity con
raint
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Journal Pre-proofIntroduction
he problem of capacity-constrained pricing decision in oligopolies has received
onsiderable attention since Kreps and Scheinkman's seminal article (1983). Mos
f the work in the field of Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopolies focused on the case
f homogeneous goods and the capacities' potential impact of relaxing price
ompetition.1 However, a large number of real-world industries characterized by
apacity constraints offer differentiated products. Examples include the airline
dustry, where capacities clearly play a central role and different companies tend
include different services in the price of their ticket (checked-in luggage, sea
servation, in-flight meal etc.). In the telecommunication sector, mobile service
perators are bound by the size of their 4G and 5G networks, and clearly offe
ifferentiated products (monthly data cap, speed, network coverage etc.). In
e hospitality industry, competing hotels tend to be differentiated (breakfast
servation policy, amenities) and constrained by the number of available rooms
inally, the co-existence of capacity constraints and physical transportation cost
lay a crucial role in the cement industry as well. Hunold et al. (2017); and Hunold
nd Muthers (2019) show this both theoretically and empirically, and discuss it
otential relevance for competition policy.
Moreover, taking into account both horizontal product differentiation and the
resence of capacity constraints might lead to novel and surprising theoretical re
lts, as first demonstrated by Wauthy (1996). Despite the prevalence of such indus
ies and the theoretical interest they present, the literature on Bertrand-Edgeworth
ligopolies with product differentiation remains scarce. As Wauthy (2014) points ou
a recent survey of this branch of literature:
 The minimal core of strategic decisions a firm has to make is three-
fold: What to produce? At which scale? At what price? A full-fledged
theory of oligopolistic competition should be able to embrace these three
dimensions jointly. [..] we do not have such a theory at our disposal. [..]
it is urgent to devote more efforts to analyze in full depth the class of
Bertrand-Edgeworth pricing games with product differentiation. 
This paper aims to make a step in this direction. Specifically, it analyze
ertrand-Edgeworth competition on markets characterized by a substantial level o
roduct differentiation. By restricting attention to relatively high levels of produc
ifferentiation in a standard Hotelling setup, it shows that there exists at least one
ure-strategy equilibrium for any capacity-pair. This stands in contrast with mos
1Recent examples include Acemoglu et al. (2009); de Frutos and Fabra (2011); Lepore (2012)
emus and Moreno (2017); Cabon-Dhersin and Drouhin (2019).
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Journal Pre-proofodels of Bertrand-Edgeworth competition that typically find non-existence fo
termediate capacity-levels. The main result of the paper is a complete characteri
ation of the pure-strategy equilibria, which reveals a variety of equilibrium firm
ehavior in this setting. In addition, I show that an even higher level of produc
ifferentiation leads to a trivial pure-strategy equilibrium: non-interacting firm
cting as local monopolies. Finally, I also demonstrate that lower levels of produc
ifferentiation destroy the existence result. In particular, there always exists a
on-empty range of capacity pairs of intermediate size for which an equilibrium in
ure strategies fails to exist. I believe that the results are most suitable to describe
latively short-run price competition as the fixed capacity sizes are more realistic
the short run.
Most closely related to this paper is Boccard and Wauthy (2010). They investi
ate the interaction between capacity constraints and Hotelling-type differentiation
nd find the absence of an equilibrium in pure strategies for intermediate capacity
vels. Their main finding is that the support of equilibrium prices consists o
finite number of atoms, and the number of these atoms is decreasing in the
vel of product differentiation. An important assumption their paper make
that consumers' valuation for the good is large compared to transportation
osts, which results in the market always being covered in equilibrium. While
is assumption prevails in the Hotelling literature2, the present paper shows tha
hides an interesting setting, namely the case of substantial product differentiation
In recent work, Hunold and Muthers (2019) investigate capacity-constrained
ompetition with horizontally differentiated consumers, with the additional key
ssumption that firms can charge location-specific prices to four different consume
gments. The special structure of horizontal differentiation is the key distinguishing
ature of their model in addition to customer-specific pricing. They find tha
ure-strategy equilibria typically fails to exist for medium capacity levels and
rovide a characterization of the mixed-strategy equilibria. They find that in the
ompetitive equilibrium, despite overcapacities, firms only serve the customer
losest to them. This finding is similar to one of the equilibria of my model (the
tuation I call secret handshake equilibrium), however, the mechanisms leading to
is are distinct. Hunold et al. (2017) build on this theoretical work to compare
ompetitive and collusive outcomes on such markets. They validate the theoretica
redictions by studying a cartel breakdown in Germany empirically. In particular
ey document the strong relationship between transport distance and capacity
2For an exception that discusses this issue in detail, see Economides (1984). For more recen
ork making the same assumption implicitly or explicitly, see for example Gal-Or (1997), Lyon
999), and Brekke et al. (2006) for models of the health care market, and Ishibashi and Kaneko
008) for a model of a mixed duopoly.
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Journal Pre-proofvels in the cement industry after the cartel breakdown.
In earlier work, Benassy (1989) and Canoy (1996) also analyze Bertrand
dgeworth models with horizontal product differentiation. The main difference with
e present paper is that both of these papers use non-standard specifications o
roduct differentiation. Specifically, Benassy (1989) captures product differentiation
rough demand elasticities in a model of monopolistic competition, whereas Canoy
996) introduces asymmetries between the firms and allows consumers to buy
veral units of the good. A common finding of all three papers is the existence o
ure-strategy equilibrium for sufficiently high levels of product differentiation. The
resent paper reformulates this result in the more standard Hotelling framework
urthermore, contrary to the papers above, the simplicity of the model allows fo
e complete characterization of pure-strategy equilibria for substantial levels o
roduct differentiation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model, formulate
e profit function and identifies the best reply strategies for intermediate levels o
roduct differentiation. Section 3 contains the main result of the paper, the complete
aracterization of the equilibria for intermediate levels of product differentiation
ection 4 discusses the results in the light of the existing literature, and also discusse
e cases of relatively low and high product differentiation. Section 5 examines a
ertical product differentiation extension of the baseline model. Section 6 concludes
The model
.1 Setting
his paper analyzes a duopoly with firms labeled 1 and 2 that produce substitute
roducts. They choose a price pi (i ∈ {1, 2}) for one unit of their product. Assume
e firms are located on the two extreme points of a unit-length Hotelling-line (Firm
at x = 0, Firm 2 at x = 1) and transportation cost is linear. Moreover, consumer
re uniformly distributed along the line but are otherwise identical. They all seek
buy one unit of the product which provides them a gross surplus v. The value o
e outside option of not buying the product is normalized to 0. In addition, the
rms face rigid capacity constraints k1, k2. For simplicity, assume that margina
osts of production are constant and normalized to zero. The size of the capacitie
s well as the value of the other parameters of the model are common knowledge
he firms' objective is to maximize their profit by choosing their price.
A consumer located at point x purchasing from Firm 1 has a net surplus of
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Journal Pre-proofv − p1 − t · x
while purchasing from Firm 2 provides her a net surplus of
v − p2 − t · (1− x)
where t is the per-unit transportation cost.
In most of this article, I assume v/t ≤ 1.5, i.e. the products of the firms are
bstantially different from one another. Furthermore, to focus on the arguably
ost interesting case, I will also assume 1 < v/t ≤ 1.5 and refer to it as intermediate
vel of product differentiation.
Boccard and Wauthy (2010) analyze a similar setting, the key difference being
e level of product differentiation. They restrict their attention to situations in
hich products are relatively close substitutes, namely v/t > 2. Below I argue
at this simplifying assumption has a surprisingly large impact on the nature
f equilibria, hence extending the analysis to the case of intermediate capacity
vels provides new insights into the mechanisms of capacity-constrained oligopolies
Finally, I complete the analysis with the cases of very high level of produc
ifferentiation, v/t ≤ 1; and low product differentiation 1.5 < v/t ≤ 2. The following
st describes the structure of this article:
• v/t ≤ 1: discussed in Section 4.1,
• 1 < v/t ≤ 1.5: discussed in Sections 2 and 3,
• 1.5 < v/t ≤ 2: discussed in Section 4.2,
• 2 < v/t: discussed in Boccard and Wauthy (2010).
.2 The profit function
ssuming rational consumers the following two constraints are straightforward. The
articipation constraint (PC) ensures that a consumer located at point x buys from
irm 1 only if her net surplus derived from this purchase is non-negative:
v ≥ p1 + t · x (PC
The market splitting condition (MS) ensures that a consumer located at poin
buys from Firm 1 only if this provides her a net surplus higher than buying from
e competitor:
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Journal Pre-proofv − p1 − t · x ≥ v − p2 − t · (1− x) (MS
Let T1 be the marginal consumer who is indifferent whether to buy from Firm
or not. In the absence of capacity constraints it is easy to see that T1 is the
inimum of the solutions of the binding constraints (PC) and (MS).
Let T 1(p2) be the location of the consumer who is indifferent between buying
om Firm 2 and not buying at all. The location of this consumer will be crucial in
e analysis to determine whether Firm 1 is better-off competing against its rival o
eing a local monopolist. Formally,
v − p2 − t(1− T 1(p2)) = 0 ⇒ T 1(p2) = p2 − v + t
t
.
Importantly, T 1 plays the role of partitioning the price space according to marke
overage.3 The net surplus being decreasing in the distance from Firm 1 implies tha
C) is binding for T1 ≤ T 1 and (MS) is binding if T1 ≥ T 1. Symmetric formula
pply to Firm 2. Therefore, in case capacities are abundant, inverse demand fo
irm 1 is given by
p1 =
{
v − t · T1 if T1 ≤ T 1,
p2 + t− 2 · t · T1 if T1 ≥ T 1.
(1
Naturally, the existence of capacity constraints means for Firm 1 that it canno
rve more than k1 consumers. Assume that after each consumer chooses the firm to
uy from (or to abstain from buying), firms have the possibility to select which con
mers to serve and they serve those who are the closest to them. In this setting thi
orresponds to the assumption of efficient rationing rule, which is extensively used
the literature. Therefore the additional constraints caused by the fixed capacity
vels can be written as:
T1 ≤ k1 and 1− T2 ≤ k2 (CC
It is important to notice that in some cases, when Firm 2 is capacity-constrained
irm 1 can extract a higher surplus from some consumers by knowing that they
annot purchase from the rival even if they wanted to since Firm 2 does not serve
em. Practically, this means that the participation constraint (PC) will always be
inding on
[
T 1, 1− k2
]
whenever this interval is not empty, i.e. whenever the rival'
apacity is sufficiently small: k2 ≤ 1−T 1. Using this observation, one can reformulate
e inverse demand in (1) for any capacity level:
3For notational simplicity, subsequently I will not indicate the argument of T 1(p2).
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Journal Pre-proofp1 =
{
v − t · T1 if T1 ≤ max{T 1, 1− k2} ,
p2 + t− 2 · t · T1 if T1 > max{T 1, 1− k2}
(2
Firm 1's profit can be simply written as pi1 = p1T1. Given the competitor'
apacity and its price choice, determining the unit price p1 is equivalent to
etermining the marginal consumer T1. The observation that prices and quantitie
an be used interchangeably will simplify the solution of the model.4 Importantly
e firms decide about prices, however, the quantities those prices imply are more
irectly comparable with the size of capacities.
The profit can thus be rewritten as
pi1(T1, p2) =
{
(v − t · T1) · T1 if T1 ≤ max{T 1, 1− k2},
(p2 + t− 2 · t · T1) · T1 if T1 > max{T 1, 1− k2}
(3
The optimization problem of the firm consists of finding the value T1 which
aximizes the above expression satisfying the capacity constraint (CC). The main
omplexity of finding the equilibria in this pricing game comes from the shape
f the profit functions. As illustrated below in Figure 2, the profit pi1(T1, p2) i
iscontinuous at point 1 − k2 if T 1 < 1 − k2. Otherwise, it is continuous bu
on-differentiable at T 1 as illustrated in Figure 1.
For notation simplicity, let the two branches of the profit function be denoted by
piLM1 ≡ (v − t · T1) · T1 and piC1 ≡ (p2 + t− 2 · t · T1) · T1.
The superscript LM stands for Local Monopoly because the firm extracts al
e consumer surplus from the marginal consumer when (PC) binds. Similarly, the
perscript C stands for Competition since the marginal consumer is indifferen
etween the offer of the two firms whenever (MS) binds.
Note that the profit function reveals another interpretation of T 1: it is the poin
here piLM1 and pi
C
1 cross (other than their crossing at 0).
.3 Potential best reply strategies
efine TLM1 = argmaxT1 pi
LM
1 and T
C
1 = argmaxT1 pi
C
1 , the values at which the two
uadratic curves attain their maxima, hence they are local maxima of the profi
4The technique of arguing in terms of quantities instead of prices is also used by Yin (2004).
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The relative order of the five variables
TLM1 , T
C
1 , T 1, 1− k2 and k1
crucial in solving the maximization problem. The main difficulty in the solution o
e firms' maximization program is twofold. On the one hand, the profit function i
iscontinuous at 1−k2 whenever k2 < 1−T 1 and non-differentiable at T 1 otherwise
n the other hand, the values
T 1 =
p2 − v + t
t
and TC1 =
p2 + t
4t
depend on the choice of the other firm, p2. The following lemma simplifies the
lution considerably.
emma 1.
LM
1 ≤ T 1 implies TC1 ≤ T 1 and TC1 ≥ T 1 implies TLM1 ≥ TC1 ≥ T 1.
roof: It is straightforward to derive
TLM1 =
v
2t
, T 1 =
p2 − v + t
t
and TC1 =
p2 + t
4t
.
hen for any t > 0
TLM1 ≤ T 1 ⇐⇒
v
2t
≤ p2 − v + t
t
⇐⇒ p2 ≥ 3
2
v − t
nd similarly
TC1 ≤ T 1 ⇐⇒
p2 + t
4t
≤ p2 − v + t
t
⇐⇒ p2 ≥ 4
3
v − t
lso
TLM1 ≤ TC1 ⇐⇒
v
2t
≤ p2 + t
4t
⇐⇒ p2 ≥ 2v − t
his proves the two parts of the lemma for any v > 0.
The form of Firm 1's profit function hinges on the relative order of T 1 and
− k2. Therefore in the following discussion I will distinguish two cases: In Case A
e capacity of Firm 2 is relatively large, 1−k2 < T 1. In Case B, 1−k2 ≥ T 1, which
eans that Firm 1 may be able to take advantage of the fact that its adversary i
latively capacity-constrained.
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Journal Pre-proofase A: 1− k2 < T 1. When the capacity of Firm 2 is relatively large, (1) show
e relation between the price p1 charged by Firm 1 and its demand (captured by the
arginal consumer T1). Using Lemma 1 three different subcases can be identified
epending on the parameter values of the model and the competitor's choice.
emma 2. Assume 1− k2 < T 1.
1) if TLM1 ≤ T 1 then the optimal choice of Firm 1 is min(TLM1 , k1),
2) if TC1 ≥ T 1 then the optimal choice of Firm 1 is min(TC1 , k1),
3) if TC1 ≤ T 1 ≤ TLM1 then the optimal choice of Firm 1 is min(T 1, k1).
Considering Lemma 1 it is easy to see that cases A1, A2 and A3 provide a
omplete partitioning of Case A. Hence for any parameter values in Case 1 and fo
very possible behavior of the competitor, the lemma identifies the best response
rategy of Firm 1. Symmetric formulas apply for Firm 2. The complete proof o
is lemma is relegated to the Appendix.
However, for an intuition, first notice that the two branches of the profi
nction, piLM1 and pi
C
1 are both quadratic functions of T1 that by definition cros
ach other at 0 and at T 1. Then depending on the values t, v and T2 one of the
ree possibilities above will hold. As an illustration of Case A2 when TC1 < k1 see
igure 1. Using Lemma 1 the condition of the case TC1 ≥ T 1 immediately implie
LM
1 ≥ T 1. We know that the profit function is composed of the function piLM1 on
e interval [0, T 1] then it switches to function pi
C
1 . The actual profit function is thu
e thick (red) curve in the figure. Then using the figure it is straightforward to find
e optimal choice of Firm 1. Since the two quadratic and concave functions cros
ach other before either of them reaches its maximum, the maximal profit will be
ttained on the second segment where pi1 = pi
C
1 . By definition, argmaxT1 pi
C
1 = T
C
1
the optimal choice, and the assumption TC1 < k1 makes this feasible.
ase B: T 1 ≤ 1 − k2. In Case B, the rival of Firm 1 disposes of relatively low
apacity. Therefore Firm 1 might be inclined to take advantage of the fact tha
irm 2 is not capable of serving consumers located on the interval [0, 1 − k2]. On
is segment Firm 1 does not have to care about its competitor's price and the
arket splitting condition (MS), it is only threatened by some consumers choosing
e outside option of not buying the product (PC) and eventually by its own
apacity constraint.
emma 3. Assume T 1 ≤ 1− k2. Then
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Journal Pre-proofFigure 1: Illustration of Case A2 (TC1 < k1)
pi1
• •
•
T1TLM1T
C
1T11-k2 k1
piC1 pi
LM
1
1) if TLM1 ≤ T 1 then the optimal choice of Firm 1 is min(TLM1 , k1),
2) if T 1 ≤ TC1 ≤ 1− k2 then the optimal choice of Firm 1 is
min(1− k2, TLM1 , k1),
3) if T 1 ≤ 1− k2 ≤ TC1 then the optimal choice of Firm 1 is
either min(1− k2, k1) or min(TC1 , k1),
4) if TC1 ≤ T 1 ≤ 1− k2 ≤ TLM1 then the optimal choice of Firm 1 is
min(1− k2, k1).
5) if TC1 ≤ T 1 ≤ TLM1 ≤ 1−k2 then the optimal choice of Firm 1 is min(TLM1 , k1)
Notice that case B1 corresponds exactly to case A1 of Lemma 2 and B5 also
escribes a very similar situation. However, the other cases are affected by the
mited capacity of the rival firm. The case closest to case A2 pictured above i
ase B2. The only difference is in the size of the rival firm's capacity, here it i
ssumed to be much smaller. As an illustration of this situation, see Figure 2
here k1 is assumed to be large in order to draw a clearer picture). As is clea
om the figure and true in general, piLM1 (x) > pi
C
1 (x) whenever x > T 1 i.e. to the
ght of the crossing point of the two curves. Hence the profit function is not only
on-differentiable as in the above case, it is also discontinuous at 1− k2. Therefore
e assumption TC1 ≤ 1− k2 ≤ TLM1 immediately implies that 1− k2 is the optima
oice of Firm 1, i.e. it produces up to the capacity of the other firm. The profi
urve and the optimal solution are shown in thick (red) on Figure 2.
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Journal Pre-proofFigure 2: Illustration of Case B2 (1− k2 < TLM1 < k1)
pi
• •
••
T1TLM1T
C
1T1 1-k2
piC1 pi
LM
1
k1
The most interesting case is arguably B3 where 3 different best replies may arise
epending on the exact parameters of the model and the competitor's choice. Thi
also the most problematic case in Boccard and Wauthy (2010) in the sense tha
is discontinuity inhibits the possible existence of pure-strategy equilibrium. As
ill show below, case B3 never arises in equilibrium when assuming intermediate
vels of product differentiation. However, in Section 4.2 when discussing the case
f 1.5 < v/t ≤ 2 I show that it does arise and the discontinuity is exactly the
ason for the non-existence of equilibria in pure strategies for low levels of produc
ifferentiation.
The next section describes the numerous equilibria of the game using the condi
onal best replies of firms described above.
Equilibria for intermediate levels of product dif-
ferentiation
this section I will determine which kinds of equilibria may arise in the interme
iate product differentiation case as a function of firms' capacities and the othe
arameters of the model (v and t). The calculations will be based on the results o
emmas 2 and 3 that describe the firms' conditional best responses.
As is clear from those lemmas, there are 5 potential equilibrium strategies fo
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TLM1 , T
C
1 , T 1, 1− k2 and k1.
The exercise of finding all equilibria consists of comparing the conditions fo
otential equilibrium strategies (described in cases A1-A3 and B1-B5) of Firm
to those of Firm 2 one-by-one and determining whether the conditions are
ompatible. In case they are, one also has to formulate the conditions in term
f the parameters of the model. Since the cases described in the two lemmas are
xhaustive, this method finds all the existing equilibria of the game. An advantage
f such a complete characterization is that for parameter regions where I find one
quilibrium only, that one is clearly the unique equilibrium.
These case-by-case calculations are by nature tedious so they are relegated to
e Appendix. The following proposition summarizes the main result of the paper
e. the findings for intermediate levels of product differentiation.
roposition 1. For 1 < v/t ≤ 1.5 there exists at least one equilibrium in pure
rategies for any capacity pair (k1, k2). The nature of the equilibria depends on the
lative size of the capacity levels, and the relative value of consumers' willingness
-pay v and their transportation cost t.
Proposition 1 is in contrast to most of the existing results about Bertrand
dgeworth oligopolies. The usual finding in the existing literature is that there i
t least one region of capacity levels for which there does not exist a pure-strategy
quilibrium. This clearly shows that the presence of substantial local monopoly
ower changes Bertrand-Edgeworth competition drastically. Even Boccard and
authy (2010) who investigate the case of slightly differentiated products face
e problem of non-existence of pure-strategy equilibrium, indeed, their main
ontribution is a partial characterization of the mixed-strategy equilibrium.
By restricting attention to intermediate levels of product differentiation, one
an provide a complete characterization of the equilibria of the model. Figure 3
lustrates the different types of equilibria that arise as a function of the parameters
or simplicity, the figure depicts the case of 1.2 < v/t ≤ 1.5.5
The capacities of Firm 1 and Firm 2 are shown on the horizontal and the
ertical axis, respectively. The values in the parentheses in every parameter region
ow the addresses of the farthest consumers Firm 1 and Firm 2 serve, respectively
5The complement case of 1 < v/t ≤ 1.2 is qualitatively equivalent and the same type of equilibria
ise. The only difference is in the ordering of the different values on the axes, in particular, th
dering of v2t and 1− v3t reverses at 1.2.
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Journal Pre-proofFigure 3: Equilibria with substantial product differentiation (1.2 < v/t ≤ 1.5)
k2
k11− v2t v3t 1− v3t v2t 1
1− v
2t
v
3t
1− v
3t
v
2t
1
k1, 1− k2
TLM1 , 1− k2
1− k2, 1− k2
T 1, 1− T 1k
1
,1
−
T
L
M
2
k
1
,k
1
ote that the figure is symmetric to the diagonal, which is a direct consequence o
e firms being identical apart from their capacities.6
apacity-constrained equilibria The simplest case is the one where k1 and
2 are both very low (k1 + k2 < 1) which inhibits the interaction between the
o firms. Consequently they maximize their profits independently by produc
g up to their capacity. Therefore (k1, 1−k2) is the unique equilibrium in this region
Assuming a similarly low capacity for Firm 2 (k2 < 1− v2t) but a larger one fo
irm 1 (k1 ≥ v2t), one gets to the region where Firm 1 cannot profitably increase
s production and implements its unconstrained local monopoly profit TLM1 =
v
2t
ence (TLM1 , 1− k2) is the unique equilibrium here.
apacity-constrained secret handshake equilibria The most interesting
gion is arguably the one where the capacity of one firm is not very low but no
6The notation may be misleading in this aspect, for example seeing the symmetry between
1, k1) and (1− k2, 1− k2) is non-trivial. The values in the parentheses denote the address of th
rthest consumer firms are willing to serve. For Firm 2, this is generally not equal to its demand
e. its strategy, instead it is given by one minus its demand. Thus the strategies used in (k1, k1
d (1− k2, 1− k2) are in fact symmetric: in both cases one firm serves up to its capacity and th
val serves all the residual demand.
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Journal Pre-proofery high either (1− v
2t
< k2 < min(1− v3t , v2t)) and the industry capacity is sufficien
cover the market (k1 + k2 ≥ 1). Firm 2 producing up to its capacity and Firm
deciding to serve the remaining 1 − k2 consumers is a pure-strategy equilibrium
f this region. Notice that the size of their capacity would allow firms to ente
to direct competition, however, it would not be profitable for Firm 1. Instead i
refers to match the residual demand of the market. Essegaier et al. (2002) find
milar equilibrium behavior in their model with heterogeneous demand and call i
secret handshake equilibrium.
Notice that in the triangle-shaped region k1, k2 < min(1− v3t , v2t) and k1+ k2 ≥ 1
.e. the one delimited by the dotted blue line, the dashed red line and the black line
Figure 3) either firm producing up to its capacity with the other one engaging in
e secret handshake constitutes an equilibrium. Thus in this region the two pure
rategy equilibria (k1, k1) and (1 − k2, 1 − k2) co-exist. Clearly, both firms would
refer serving up to their own capacity, therefore none of the equilibria Pareto dom
ates the other one. To illustrate how these two equilibria are sustained, conside
e incentives of the firms at (1−k2, 1−k2). It is the best outcome for Firm 2, so the
ore interesting question is why Firm 1 will not deviate from it. First, 1− k2 < v2
nsures that 1 − k2 is on the increasing part of piLM1 , therefore all strategies below
− k2 are dominated. Second, as Firm 2's strategy implies a price of p2 = v − k2t
e condition k2 < 1 − v3t is equivalent to TC1 (v − k2t) < 1 − k2. Thus 1 − k2 is on
e decreasing part of the piC1 curve, which means that all strategies in the interva
− k2, k1] are also dominated.
nconstrained secret handshake equilibria Lastly, when both capacities are
rge (k1, k2 > min(1− v3t , v2t)) there is a continuum of equilibria in pure strategies
s T 1 depends on p2 and thus on T2 and vice versa, the location of the indifferen
onsumer (T 1 = T 2) may take any values in between 1 − v2t and min(1 − v3t , v2t)
urthermore, these equilibria could also be described as a type of secret handshake
nce here T 1 = T 2 holds so the market is exactly covered by the two firms. In
e proof of Proposition 1, I show that v/t ≤ 1.5 is a necessary condition for the
xistence of unconstrained secret handshake equilibria. Note that the multiplicity
f equilibria is a standard result for Hotelling models with substantial produc
ifferentiation without capacity constraints (Economides [1984]), so its presence i
atural for the case of abundant capacities.
Notice that the unconstrained secret handshake equilibria are similar to the
quilibria in Hunold and Muthers (2019) where firms only serve their home market
e. the consumers closest to them. The main difference is that firms charge location
ecific prices as opposed to uniform prices as in the present model.
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Journal Pre-proofOther levels of product differentiation
order to obtain a more complete picture of how Hotelling-type product differ
ntiation and capacities interact, in this Section I investigate the cases of very
igh product differentiation (v/t < 1) and the case of low product differentiation
.5 < v/t ≤ 2) which have been missing from the literature. The analysis of the
maining case (v/t > 2) can be found in Boccard and Wauthy (2010). To see how
e results of the baseline model are related to the existing literature, I then compare
e type of equilibria that can arise for intermediate capacity levels for all possible
vels of product differentiation.
.1 Case of very high product differentiation: v/t ≤ 1
hen products are very differentiated, the analysis is fairly straightforward. First
otice that choosing TLM1 =
v
2t
is always optimal whenever available as it maximize
LM
1 , the local monopoly branch of the profit function, and pi
LM
1 (T
LM
1 ) > pi
C
1 (T
C
1 )
herefore, any price leading to T1 >
v
2t
would be suboptimal. In other words, neithe
rm wants to choose low prices that would attract more than v
2t
consumers. However
is means that the firms want to serve less than 1/2 of the market in the case o
/t ≤ 1. Therefore, firms never enter into direct competition, they both act as loca
onopolists, serving v
2t
consumers if their capacity permits it. The following Lemma
mmarizes these findings.
emma 4. In case of very high product differentiation, i.e. for v/t ≤ 1, there i
unique pure-strategy equilibrium for any capacity pair. Both firms act as loca
onopolists: firm i serves min{ki, v/2t} consumers at price v − tmin{ki, v/2t}.
.2 Case of low product differentiation: 1.5 < v/t ≤ 2
this Subsection I complete the analysis with the case of low product differentia
on: 1.5 < v/t ≤ 2. I show that there always exist a non-empty range of parameter
r which a pure-strategy equilibrium fails to exist. This highlights the importance
f the intermediate level of product differentiation in the main model. Moreover
show that the semi-mixed equilibrium identified in Boccard and Wauthy (2010
emma 4) also exists for 1.5 < v/t ≤ 2. This slightly unusual type of equilibrium
onsists of one firm playing a pure strategy (a single price) and its rival randomizing
etween two strategies.
To see that there are capacity pairs for which no pure-strategy equilibrium exist
r 1.5 < v/t ≤ 2, I highlight the three main differences with respect to the main
odel. First, v/t > 3/2 excludes the existence of unconstrained secret handshake
quilibria, i.e. firms playing (T 1, T 2). Intuitively, for v/t > 3/2 the price firms would
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Journal Pre-proofarge in such an equilibrium (2v + t) is so high compared to the competitive price
hich is independent of v) that the best reply is undercutting it by playing the
ompetitive strategy and gaining a large market share.
The second main difference is that for v/t > 3/2 a classic Hotelling-type
quilibrium of both firms choosing the competitive strategy and prices equal to
(leading to market shares TC1 = 1 − TC1 = TC2 = 12) exists for sufficiently high
apacity levels.
Third, v/t > 3/2 means that 1 − v
3t
< 1
2
< v
3t
, i.e. the ordering of some key
ut-off values is reversed with respect to the main model. This has surprisingly
portant consequences. On the one hand, 1 − v
3t
< 1
2
is the upper bound fo
apacity-constrained secret handshake equilibria (1−k2, 1−k2). On the other hand
show in the Appendix that
k ≡ 1− v/t−
√
(v/t)2 − 2
2
>
1
2
the lower bound for the existence of a Hotelling-type equilibrium. The nex
roposition states that there is no pure-strategy equilibrium in the parameter range
artly) delimited by 1− v
3t
< k2 < k.
roposition 2. For low levels of product differentiation, i.e. for 1.5 < v/t ≤ 2 there
xists a non-empty range of capacity pairs for which no pure-strategy equilibrium
xists. This range is defined by capacity pairs (k1, k2) that jointly satisfy
) k1 + k2 > 1 and (ii) min{k1, k2} ≥ 1− v3t and (iii) max{k1, k2} ≤ k.
Figure 3 depicts the different equilibria for 1.5 < v/t ≤ 2. The shaded area is the
nge of capacity pairs with no pure-strategy equilibrium. Clearly, k > 1/2 ensure
at this area is non-empty. Moreover, the lower the level of product differentiation
he higher v/t is), the larger this area becomes since k is increasing in v/t and
− v
3t
is decreasing in v/t.
The proof of Proposition 2, relegated to the Appendix, consists of finding al
ure-strategy equilibria, revealing the lack of such equilibria for the paramete
nge defined in the Proposition. Intuitively, for capacity pairs in this range
ere is an Edgeworth-cycle that can be described as follows. Assume Firm 1
laying 1 − k2 and the corresponding relatively high price. It is then in Firm 2'
terest to undercut that price by choosing its competitive best reply and gaining
large market share. However, facing a low price, it is in Firm 1's interest to
gain market share by also lowering its price. Both firms playing low competitive
rices cannot be an equilibrium, either: it is then in Firm 2's interest to raise it
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Journal Pre-proofFigure 4: Equilibria with low product differentiation (1.5 < v/t ≤ 2)
k2
k11− v2t 1− v3t12
v
3t k
v
2t
1
1− v
2t
1− v
3t
1
2
v
3t
k
v
2t
1
k1, 1− k2
TLM1 , 1− k2
1− k2, 1− k2
1
2 ,
1
2k
1
,T
L
M
2
k
1
,k
1
rice by playing 1−k2. In turn, Firm 1 also raises its price and the cycle starts again
Finally, this intuition may also help explain the existence of a semi-mixed equi
brium in which one firm plays a pure strategy while the other randomizes between
o strategies. I show in the Appendix that this type of equilibrium, identified in
occard and Wauthy (2010, Lemma 4) for the case of v/t > 2, also exists fo
.5 < v/t ≤ 2. In particular, Firm 2 choosing its price equal to
p2 ≡
√
8t(v − t(1− k2))(1− k2)− t
makes Firm 1 indifferent between playing TC1 or 1− k2. In turn, Firm 1 playing
− k2 with probability w and TC1 with probability 1− w with
0 < w =
3
√
2(v − t(1− k2))(1− k2)− 3
√
t
3
√
2(v − t(1− k2))(1− k2) + (2k2 − 3)
√
t
< 1
makes p2 the optimal choice for Firm 2. This type of equilibrium is arguably
teresting when comparing the different types of equilibria that arise for differen
vels of product differentiation, an exercise I do in the next subsection.
.3 Comparison of product differentiation levels
this Subsection, I compare the case of intermediate capacity levels with varying
egrees of product differentiation.
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Journal Pre-proof(i) v/t =∞: mixed-strategy equilibria with continuous support
(ii) 2 < v/t <∞: mixed-strategy equilibria with finite support
iii) 1.5 < v/t ≤ 2: semi-mixed equilibria
iv) 1 < v/t ≤ 1.5: nontrivial pure-strategy equilibria
(v) v/t ≤ 1: trivial pure-strategy equilibrium
(i) is the case of homogeneous goods which is the seminal result of Krep
nd Scheinkman (1983). (ii) is the main result of Boccard and Wauthy (2010)
urthermore, they prove that the number of atoms used in equilibrium is decreasing
v/t. (iii) is the case investigated in Subsection 4.2. (iv) is the main result of thi
rticle, described in Section 3. (v) is the local monopoly case discussed in Section 4.1
In light of this comparison, the main result of the paper, the existence of pure
rategy equilibrium for all capacity pairs, can be seen as the number of atoms used
equilibrium being reduced all the way to one for intermediate levels of produc
ifferentiation. This is also why the semi-mixed equilibrium arising for 1.5 < v/t ≤ 2
of interest: one can view it as a smooth transition between completely mixed
quilibria with finite support and pure-strategy equilibria.
Vertical product differentiation extension
the next section, I will analyze a model where firms are asymmetric in the
llowing sense: Firm 2 will be located at point 1 + a, with 0 < a < 1, while Firm
remains at 0 and consumers are located uniformly on [0, 1].7 Thus Firm 2 i
isadvantaged: It is located on average a units farther from the consumers than
s rival. This setup can also be thought of as a particular form of vertical produc
ifferentiation. Therefore this asymmetric model will serve as a robustness check
r the baseline model of pure horizontal product differentiation.
The main difference with the baseline model is in the net surplus consumer
erive from purchasing from Firm 2. For a consumer located at 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, it i
iven by
v − p2 − (1 + a− x)t
thus each consumer buying from Firm 2 incurs an additional transportation
ost of at compared to the baseline model. Consequently, both the participation
onstraint and the market splitting constraint of consumers of Firm 2 are changed
7I would like to thank to Xavier Wauthy for the idea of this model variant.
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Journal Pre-proofFigure 5: Asymmetric equilibria (1.2 + 0.6a < v/t ≤ 1.5)
k2
k1v
8t
+ a
8
+ 1
4
1− v
2t
+ a
2
1− v
3t
+ a
3
v
2t
1
v
8t
− a
4
+ 1
4
1− v
2t
1− v
3t
+ a
v
2t
− a
2
1
k1, 1− k2
TLM1 , 1− k2
1− k2, 1− k2
T 1, T 2k
1
,1
−
T
L
M
2
k
1
,k
1
v − p2 − (1 + a− x)t ≥ 0 (PC'
and
v − p1 − tx ≥ v − p2 − (1 + a− x)t (MS'
It is also important to note that the capacity constraints are unchanged. Despite
eing farther from the consumers, Firm 2 still has the possibility of serving k
onsumers if it can attract them with a low price.
Naturally, the 5 potential equilibrium strategies of both firms are also affected
y the asymmetry. Somewhat surprisingly, I can show that despite these changes
oth Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 hold for 0 < a < 1. The proofs are relegated to
e Appendix. The next proposition summarizes the main result of the asymmetric
odel.
roposition 3. For 1 < v/t ≤ 1.2 + 0.4a there exists at least one equilibrium in
ure strategies for any capacity pair (k1, k2). For 1.2 + 0.4a < v/t ≤ 1.5 there is no
ure-strategy equilibrium for capacity levels satisfying k1 + k2 > 1 and
v
8t
+ 1−a
4
<
2 < 1− v2t . Moreover, for 1.2+0.6a < v/t ≤ 1.5 there is no pure-strategy equilibrium
r capacity-pairs satisfying k1 + k2 > 1 and
v
8t
+ a
8
+ 1
4
< k1 < 1− v2t + a2 either.
Proposition 3 states that the main result of the baseline model holds in the
symmetric model as well for relatively high levels of product differentiation
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Journal Pre-proofowever, for lower levels, it identifies two parameter regions without pure-strategy
quilibrium. Hence the existence result of pure-strategy equilibria for any capacity
vel is only partially robust to the the introduction of vertical product differentia
on.
Intuitively, if the level of product differentiation is high (1 < v/t ≤ 1.2 + 0.4a)
en the local monopoly power of firms is sufficiently strong to impede direc
ompetition. Similarly to the baseline model, firms act as local monopolies if thei
apacity is small and engage in secret handshake equilibria for higher capacity
vels. However, for lower levels of product differentiation (but still assuming
/t ≤ 1.5) the asymmetry in firms' location results in the lack of equilibria fo
termediate capacity levels.
As illustrated in Figure 5, the size of the two areas without pure-strategy equi
brium (shaded in the figure) depend on a in an intuitive way: the larger the asym
etry, the larger the regions without pure-strategy equilibria. Conversely, these two
reas disappear as the two firms become symmetric (i.e. a→ 0), in other words thi
odel variant converges to the baseline model. To see this, it is sufficient to check
at all cut-offs converge to their equivalent in the baseline model, moreover, the
idth of the two areas, i.e.(
1− v
2t
+
a
2
)
−
(
v
8t
+
a
8
+
1
4
)
and
(
1− v
2t
)
−
(
v
8t
+
1− a
4
)
go to zero as a goes to zero for v/t = 1.2 and they become negative for produc
ifferentiation levels that correspond to v/t > 1.2.
Conclusion
his paper analyzes a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly with exogenous capacity
onstraints and a non-negligible degree of product differentiation. The complete
aracterization of the model's equilibria was feasible and showed that there exist
t least one pure-strategy equilibrium for any capacity level. This contrasts with
e usual result of existing Bertrand-Edgeworth models that find nonexistence o
ch equilibria for some capacity levels. Moreover, the analysis of an asymmetric
odel revealed that the existence result is partially robust to the introduction o
ertical product differentiation.
The main finding of the paper illuminates the importance of local monopoly
ower in the price setting of capacity-constrained industries, especially in the
ort run where exogenous capacities are realistic. As Hunold and Muthers (2019
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Journal Pre-proofescribe more in detail, such findings can be interesting for competition policy cases
r example in the cement industry. In particular, if the competitive equilibrium i
cret handshake then competition authorities may mistake equilibrium behavio
r collusion.
A clear limitation of the present model is that capacities are exogenously given
owever, endogenizing the choice of capacity investment seems to be intractable
ue to the multiplicity of equilibria in certain parameter regions.
Another limitation is that the location of firms on the Hotelling line is fixed. On
e one hand, from d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979) we know that there
no pure-strategy equilibrium in a game of endogenous location choice followed by
ricing if the capacity constraints are very large, i.e. if k1, k2 > 1 (and transportation
osts are linear as in the present paper). On the other hand, there is clearly a
ontinuum of pure-strategy equilibria if capacities are very small, i.e. k1+k2 < 1, in
hich Firm i serves the closest ki/2 consumers on each side, for the local monopoly
rice of v−tki/2, and firms locate at a distance of at least (k1+k2)/2 from each othe
that there is no overlap in their customers. However, for intermediate levels o
apacities the model in Section 5 suggests8 a potential lack of pure-strategy equilibria
the pricing stage when location choices are asymmetric. For this reason, the
nalysis of endogenous location choice for intermediate capacity levels is beyond the
ope of this paper.
Appendix
roof of Lemma 2
1) First assume TLM1 < k1. By Lemma 2 the condition T
LM
1 < T 1 implies T
C
1 <
T 1. By definition T
LM
1 is the profit maximizing quantity on the pi
LM
1 curve
Hence
piLM1 (T
LM
1 ) ≥ piLM1 (T 1) = piC1 (T 1) ≥ piC1 (x) for all x > T 1
where the last inequality holds because TC1 < T 1 means that pi
C
1 is decreasing
on the interval in question.
8Section 5 discusses a model where the asymmetry comes from one of the firms sitting outsid
e Hotelling line and finds that pure-strategy equilibria fail to exist for some intermediate capacity
airs and product differentiation levels. However, I believe this result is a strong indication for th
se relevant for the analysis of endogenous location choice where the asymmetry comes from th
rms being located in the interior of the Hotelling line.
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Journal Pre-proofk1 is clearly the optimal choice when T
LM
1 ≥ k1 as piLM1 is increasing up to
TLM1 .
2) is proved in the main text.
3) Assume T 1 < k1. Firstly, T
C
1 ≤ T 1 implies that
piLM1 (T 1) = pi
C
1 (T 1) ≥ piC1 (x) for all x > T 1
Secondly, T 1 ≤ TLM1 implies that
piLM1 (x) ≤ piLM1 (T 1) = piC1 (T 1) for all x < T 1
This means that the profit function is increasing up to T 1 and then it i
decreasing. Again, k1 is clearly the optimal choice when T 1 ≥ k1 as piLM1 i
increasing up to T 1.
roof of Lemma 3
1) The proof of case (B1) is identical to the proof of case (A1) above.
2) is proved in the main text.
3) T 1 ≤ 1− k2 ≤ TC1 implies that Firm 1 must compare piLM1 (1− k2) to piC1 (TC1
which are the two local maxima of the profit function, except if k1 is low, then
the capacity might be the optimal choice.
4) Given the condition T 1 < 1− k2, the constraint (PC) binds on [0, 1− k2]. The
profit function piLM1 is increasing up to 1− k2 since TLM1 > 1− k2. Moreover
piLM1 (1− k2) > piC1 (1− k2) and also piC1 is decreasing above 1− k2.
5) Given the condition T 1 < 1− k2, the constraint (PC) binds on [0, 1− k2]. The
unconstrained optimum at TLM1 (< 1− k2) is feasible for Firm 1 whenever it
capacity is sufficiently large.
roof of Proposition 1 The proof builds heavily on the results of Lemmata 2
nd 3 that identify parameter regions in which one of the 5 potential equilib
um strategies dominate any other strategy for a given firm. In the following
check the conditions of the 15 possible combinations of the potentially domi
ating strategies of the two firms and determine whether they are compatible or not
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Journal Pre-proofirstly, notice that any case where k1 + k2 ≤ 1 is trivial: the firms do not have
fficient capacity to cover the market, they can never enter into competition
ence pii = pi
LM
i and the only possible equilibrium is Firm 1 playing min(T
LM
1 , k1
nd similarly, Firm 2 playing max(TLM2 , 1 − k2). In the following, I consider the
ase of k1 + k2 > 1.
onsider the 5 cases in which Firm 1 plays TLM1 :
M : When Firm 2 plays TLM2 both firms serve v/2t consumers and their price i
equal to p1 = p2 = v/2. This may only happen if condition (A1) or (B1) o
(B5) is satisfied for both firms. (A1) and (B1) imply pi >
3
2
v − t which in
turn implies v/t < 1 which contradicts Assumption 1. The only remaining
possibility is that (B5) holds for both firms. However, that cannot be, as i
necessitates k1 < T
LM
2 < T 2 = T 1 < T
LM
1 < 1 − k2, which in turn implie
k1 + k2 ≤ 1. Therefore this case will never arise in equilibrium if k1 + k2 > 1.
C
2 : Firm 1 playing T
LM
1 while Firm 2 plays T
C
2 can never happen since by definition
this would entail (MS) binding for Firm 2 and slack for Firm 1 which is a
contradiction.
T 2: Firm 2 cannot play T 2 for the same reason it cannot play T
C
2 .
k1: Firm 2 playing k1 is incompatible with Firm 1 playing T
LM
1 . To see this, notice
that playing k1 can only be optimal for Firm 2 if the condition of Case B i
satisfied, namely k1 < T 2, thus
v
2t
< k1 < T 2 =
v − p1
t
=
v
2t
,
which is a contradiction. The last inequality is a result of p1 = v/2.
k2: Next I show that Firm 2 playing 1− k2 and Firm 1 playing TLM1 is an equilib
rium if k1 > v/2t and k2 < 1− v/2t. Notice that p1 = v/2 and p2 = v − t · k2
By replacing these values into the formulas, it is easy to see that
1− TC2 < 1− T 2 < 1− TLM2
which means by Lemma 3 that Firm 2 should play max(T 2, 1 − k2). Since
T 2 = v/2t < 1− k2 it is optimal for Firm 2 to play 1− k2. Finally, notice tha
according to case (B5), k1 > v/2t implies that playing T
LM
1 is a best reply fo
Firm 1 as well.
ow consider the 4 cases where Firm 1 plays 1− k2. (The remaining fifth such case
symmetric to one case analyzed above.) This may only be optimal for the firm
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Journal Pre-proofone of the conditions (B2), (B3) or (B4) holds. Notice that it is common among
ese conditions that T 1 ≤ 1− k2, moreover, 1− k2 is only played when (PC) bind
p1 = v − t · (1− k2).
k2: If Firm 2 plays 1− k2, p2 = v − t · k2 always holds. Conditions for (B2) imply
p2 <
4
3
v − t and TC1 < 1− k2 which imply 1− v/3t < k2 < 1− v/3t so (B2) i
not compatible with k2.
Conditions for (B3) require that piLM1 (1−k2) > piC1 (TC1 ) which is equivalent to
0 >
(v + t(1− k2))2
8t
− (v − (1− k2)(1− k2)) ⇐⇒ 0 > [v − 3t(1− k2)]2
which is impossible, so (B3) is also incompatible with k2.
Conditions for (B4) are in turn compatible with Firm 2 playing 1 − k2. The
conditions for a (1− k2, 1− k2)-type equilibrium are the following:
1− v
2t
< k2 < min(1− v
3t
,
v
2t
) and k1 + k2 > 1.
Firstly, it is optimal for Firm 1 to play 1− k2 to Firm 2 playing 1− k2 if and
only if 1− v
2t
< k2 < 1− v3t . Secondly, 1− k2 is a best reply for Firm 2 to Firm
1 playing 1 − k2 if and only if v3t < k2 < v2t or v3t ≥ k2 which reduces to the
additional constraint of k2 <
v
2t
.
T 2: Notice that when Firm 2 plays T 2 and Firm 1 plays 1 − k2, T 2 = 1 − k2 so
the cut-off value for Firm 2 exactly coincides with it serving consumers up to
capacity. This means that this case is identical to the one above.
C
2 : Notice that T
C
2 is only played by Firm 2 if T
C
2 > T 2 which implies p1 <
4
3
v−
which is equivalent to k2 < v/3t. However, T
C
2 < k2 which entails k2 > v/3t i
also necessary. This shows that TC2 is incompatible with Firm 1 playing 1−k2
k1: Firm 2 playing k1 is incompatible withFirm 1 playing 1− k2. These quantitie
entail prices p1 = v− t · (1−k2) and p2 = v− t(1−k1) which imply T 2 = 1−k
and T 1 = k1. However, conditions for Firm 1 playing 1 − k2 (case B) require
k1 = T 1 ≤ 1− k2 which is ruled out by k1 + k2 > 1.
ow consider the 3 cases when Firm 1 plays T 1.
T 2: There is an equilibrium where Firm 2 plays T 2 and Firm 1 plays T 1. The
conditions of optimality translate to p1 + p2 = 2v − t and also 43v − t <
p2 <
3
2
v− t. Furthermore, conditions concerning the capacities require k1, k2 ≥
min(1− v
3t
, v
2t
). Thus there is a continuum of of equilibria in this capacity range
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Journal Pre-proofk2: Firm 2 playing 1 − k2 and Firm 1 playing T 1 is possible only if 1 − k2 = T
otherwise the (MS) constraint would bind for the one firm but not for the
other. If this is true, the case is naturally identical to the case above.
C
2 : Firm 2 playing T
C
2 is impossible when firm plays T 1 because then the constrain
(MS) would be binding for Firm 1 and slack for Firm 2 which is a contradiction
ow consider the 2 cases when Firm 1 plays TC1 .
C
2 : Both firms playing the competitive strategy leads to p1 = p2 = t and both
firms serving exactly 1/2 of the market. However, this requires T 1 < T
C
1 (in
both A2 and B3) which from Lemma 2 implies p2 = t ≤ 43v − t. This in turn
implies that product differentiation is low, v/t > 1.5 which case is excluded in
this Proposition.
k2: Firm 2 playing 1 − k2 and Firm 1 playing TC2 is possible only if k2 = TC2
otherwise the (MS) constraint would bind for the one firm but not for the
other. If this is true, the case is naturally identical to the case above.
he remaining case is when both firms serve consumers up to their capacity. How
ver, Lemma 3 ensures it can only be optimal for firms to do so if (PC) is binding
r their marginal consumers. This is clearly impossible when k1 + k2 > 1.
roof of Proposition 2 The proof consists of two steps.
First, it is straightforward to verify that the results in Lemmata 2 and 3 also
old under 1.5 < v/t ≤ 2.
Second, analogously to the proof of Proposition 1, one can analyze all potentia
quilibrium strategies to find all pure-strategy equilibria. Clearly, most of the 15
ases above are unchanged by the level of product differentiation. Therefore, in the
llowing I investigate only potential equilibrium strategy pairs where the assump
on 1.5 < v/t ≤ 2 induces a change with respect to the case of intermediate produc
ifferentiation.
C
1 ): Both firms playing the competitive strategy leads to p1 = p2 = t and both
firms serving exactly 1/2 of the market. For v/t > 1.5, this is possible unde
the conditions of (A2) or (B3). The former implies k2 ≥ 1−T 1 = v/t−1 using
that p2 = t. We have a symmetric condition for Firm 1's capacity: k1 ≥ v/t−1
Next, (B3) requires piLM1 (T
LM
1 ) ≤ piC1 (TC1 ). Straightforward calculations show
that this condition is equivalent to
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√
(v/t)2 − 2
2
.
Clearly, we also need a symmetric condition for Firm 1's capacity for (TC1 , 1−
TC1 ) to be an equilibrium: k1 ≥ k. Furthermore, k is strictly increasing in v/
and its value is exactly 0.5 at v/t = 1.5, thus k > 0.5 for v/t > 1.5. Finally
note that k < v/t− 1 holds for all v/t > 1.5, therefore the second condition i
weaker. Consequently, k1, k2 > k is necessary and sufficient for the existence
of a (TC1 , 1− TC1 )-type equilibrium.
1): As opposed to the case of v/t ≤ 1.5, this type of equilibrium cannot arise fo
1.5 < v/t ≤ 2. To see this, note that in such an equilibrium p1 + p2 = 2v −
must hold and also 4
3
v − t < p1, p2 < 32v − t. These three conditions imply
v
2
< p1, p2 <
2
3
v. For such prices to exist on must have
4
3
v − t < 2
3
v ⇔ 2
3
v < t
which does not hold for 1.5 < v/t.
roof of existence of semi-mixed equilibria Following Boccard and Wauthy
010, Lemma 4), the proof is by construction. Let p2 denote the price that make
irm 1 indifferent between playing 1− k2 and TC1 . Then
(p2 + t)
2
8t
= (v − t(1− k2))(1− k2) ⇔ p2 =
√
8t(v − t(1− k2))(1− k2)− t.
It remains to show that there exist weights (with values between 0 and 1) fo
irm 1's strategies that indeed make p2 the optimal choice for Firm 2. The profit o
irm 2 can be written as
pi2(p2) = p2
(
wk2 + (1− w)t− p2 + p1
2t
)
as the demand of Firm 2 exceeds k2 when Firm 1 plays 1 − k2 by k2 < k and
e fraction provides the location of the indifferent consumer when Firm 1 plays the
ompetitive price response p1 =
p2+t
2
while Firm 2 plays p2. The profit is clearly
oncave in p2, so the optimal price for Firm 2 is given by the first order condition
′
2(p˜2) = 0. Tedious but straightforward calculations show that the weight w tha
quate this optimal price p˜2 with p2 that makes Firm 1 indifferent is given by
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3
√
2(v − t(1− k2))(1− k2)− 3
√
t
3
√
2(v − t(1− k2))(1− k2) + (2k2 − 3)
√
t
.
To see that 0 < w < 1, note that the numerator of this fraction is strictly smalle
an its denominator, so it suffices to show that the numerator is strictly positive
his in turn is equivalent to
√
2(v − t(1− k2))(1− k2)−
√
t > 0 ⇔ 2(v − t(1− k2))(1− k2) > t
which in turn is ensured by the condition p2 > t which always hold in the region
ithout pure-strategy equilibria. Finally, a last necessary condition for existence o
ch a semi-mixed equilibrium is
k1 ≥ TC1 (p2) ⇔ k21 ≥
1
2
( v
2t
)2
or k2 ≥ 1− v
2t
+
√( v
2t
)2
− 2k21,
where the last cut-off is clearly below 1 for any k1. Therefore there always exis
apacity pairs without pure-strategy equilibria for which the semi-mixed equilibrium
erived here exists.
roof of Proposition 3 Firstly, I show that Lemma 1 holds in the asymmetric
odel as well. The logic of the proof is similar to the original one. The new value
f potential equilibrium strategies of Firm 1 are the following:
TLM1 =
v
2t
, TC1 =
p2 + (1 + a)t
4t
, T 1 = 1 + a− v − p2
t
,
therefore
TLM1 ≤ T 1 ⇐⇒ p2 ≥
3
2
v − (1 + a)t
nd
TC1 ≤ T 1 ⇐⇒ p2 ≥
4
3
v − (1 + a)t
nd
TLM1 ≤ TC1 ⇐⇒ p2 ≥ 2v − (1 + a)t.
he above inequalities prove Lemma 1 holds for Firm 1. Similarly, the new potentia
quilibrium strategies of Firm 2 are:
TLM2 = 1−
v
2t
+
a
2
, TC2 = 1−
p1 + t
4t
+
a
4
, T 2 =
v − p1
t
,
therefore
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Journal Pre-proofTLM2 ≥ T 2 ⇐⇒ p1 ≥
3
2
v − t− at
2
nd
TC2 ≥ T 2 ⇐⇒ p1 ≥
4
3
v − t− at
3
nd
TLM2 ≥ TC2 ⇐⇒ p1 ≥ 2v − at.
It is easy to see that a < v/t implies both
4
3
v − t− at
3
≤ 3
2
v − t− at
2
≤ 2v − at.
Thus the assumptions of a < 1 and 1 ≤ v/t together imply that Lemma 1 hold
r Firm 2 as well.
Secondly, Lemma 1 being satisfied in the asymmetric model directly imply tha
emmas 2 and 3 will also hold.
Thirdly, one must repeat the steps of the proof of Proposition 1 to find the pure
rategy equilibria of the asymmetric model. Below I will only show calculations fo
rategy-pairs forming an equilibrium or where the reasoning is different than the
ne in Proposition 1. For all other strategy-pairs the logic of the proof of Proposition
remains the same with obvious modifications. Let (T1, T2) denote a strategy-pai
ith Firm 1 choosing T1 and Firm 2 choosing T2 as its marginal consumer.
2): Clearly, both firms serving up to capacity is still an equilibrium if k1+ k2 ≤ 1
k1 ≤ TLM1 and k2 ≤ 1− TLM2 .
M): Importantly, (TLM1 , T
LM
2 ) can be an equilibrium of the asymmetric model even
if
k1 + k2 > 1 and k1 ≥ v
2t
and k2 ≥ 1− v
2t
given that v/t ≤ 1+a/2. Indeed, if (A1) or (B1) holds for both firms, ensuring
that the strategies are mutual best replies, then p1 = v/2 and p2 = v/2− a/2
imply v/t ≤ 1 + a/2 and vica versa.
2): Using the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 1, one obtains tha
both firms choosing 1− k2 is an equilibrium if and only if
1− v
2t
< k2 ≤ min(1− v
3t
+ a,
v
2t
− a
2
) and k1 + k2 > 1.
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Journal Pre-proof1): Similarly to the equilibrium above, one can show that both firms choosing k
as their marginal consumer is an equilibrium if and only if
1− v
2t
+
a
2
< k1 ≤ min(1− v
3t
+
a
3
,
v
2t
) and k1 + k2 > 1.
2): The conditions of optimality translate to p1 + p2 = 2v − t − at and also
v
2
< p1 <
2
3
v. Consequently conditions concerning the capacities require
k1, k2 ≥ min(1− v
3t
,
v
2t
− a
2
)
for this strategy-pair to constitute an equilibrium.
2): The capacity-pairs for which these strategies form an equilibrium are crucially
different for a > 0 than for a = 0. Firstly, the condition for Firm 1 playing
TLM1 being a best reply to Firm 2 playing 1− k2 is simply
k2 < 1− v
2t
and k1 ≥ v
2t
.
However, 1− k2 being a best reply for Firm 2 to TLM1 depends on the degree
of product differentiation and a. There are 3 cases:
(i) v/t ≤ 1 + 0.5a: Then 1− k2 is optimal to play if and only if k2 ≤ v2t − a2
Thus (TLM1 , 1− k2) is an equilibrium if and only if
k1 ≥ v
2t
and k2 ≤ v
2t
− a
2
< 1− v
2t
,
where the last inequality stems from the assumption of case (i).
(ii) 1 + 0.5a < v/t ≤ 1.2 + 0.4a: Then 1− k2 is optimal to play if and only i
k2 ≤ 1− v2t which is exactly the condition for optimality for Firm 1, thu
in this case (TLM1 , 1− k2) is an equilibrium if and only if
k2 < 1− v
2t
and k1 ≥ v
2t
.
(iii) v/t > 1.2+0.4a: Then 1−k2 is optimal to play if and only if k2 ≤ v8t+ 1−a4
Thus (TLM1 , 1− k2) is an equilibrium if and only if
k1 ≥ v
2t
and k2 ≤ v
8t
+
1− a
4
< 1− v
2t
,
where the last inequality stems from the assumption of case (iii).
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Journal Pre-proofM): Similarly to the equilibrium above, three cases can be distinguished, and sim
ilar reasoning reveals that
(i) If v/t ≤ 1 + 0.5a then (k1, TLM2 ) is an equilibrium if and only if
k2 ≥ v
2t
− a
2
and k1 ≤ v
2t
≤ 1− v
2t
+
a
2
.
(ii) If 1+0.5a < v/t ≤ 1.2+0.6a then (k1, TLM2 ) is an equilibrium if and only
if
k2 ≥ v
2t
− a
2
and k1 ≤ 1− v
2t
+
a
2
.
(iii) If v/t > 1.2 + 0.6a then (k1, T
LM
2 ) is an equilibrium if and only if
k2 ≥ v
2t
− a
2
and k1 ≤ v
8t
+
a
8
+
1
4
< 1− v
2t
+
a
2
.
A comparison of the capacity thresholds delimiting the different kinds of equilib
a reveals the first part of Proposition 3. Indeed, for v/t ≤ 1.2 + 0.4a the capacity
airs for which there exist at least one equilibrium cover the whole positive quadrant
owever, for v/t > 1.2+0.4a there is no pure-strategy equilibrium for capacity-pair
tisfying
k1 + k2 > 1 and
v
8t
+
1− a
4
< k2 < 1− v
2t
.
Moreover, for v/t > 1.2+0.6a there is no pure-strategy equilibrium for capacity
airs satisfying
k1 + k2 > 1 and
v
8t
+
a
8
+
1
4
< k1 < 1− v
2t
+
a
2
either.
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